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TOBACCO WARS: WILL THE RULE OF LAW SURVIVE?
ROBERT A. LEVY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1997, attorneys general representing dozens of states,
joined by plaintiffs' lawyers and public health advocates, announced a
"Proposed Resolution" of the tobacco wars.' The 68-page document
called for immunizing tobacco companies from future punitive dam-
ages2 and class action lawsuits,3 capping compensatory damages in
suits brought by individuals,4 and withdrawing dozens of suits seeking
recovery of Medicaid outlays for smoking-related illnesses.5 In return,
the industry agreed to disgorge $370 billion over 25 years, 6 pay penal-
ties if youth smoking does not decline by a specified percentage, 7 sub-
mit to regulation by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),8 cease
all vending machine sales,9 and eliminate advertising allegedly
targeted at children.1 °
Nearly a year later, after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain con-
crete guidance from the White House, Congress began its delibera-
tions. 1 It quickly became apparent that sentiment had shifted against
the industry, perhaps as a result of embarrassing disclosures sug-
gesting that tobacco companies may have targeted underage smokers,
manipulated nicotine content, and lied about its addictive qualities.'
2
* Robert A. Levy, Ph.D., J.D., is senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato
Institute in Washington, D.C. The author would like to thank C. Teddy Li for his valuable
assistance in preparing this article, which is an adaptation of the author's testimony before
the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, July 16 and August 15, 1997.
1. Proposed Resolution (visited Aug. 27, 1998) <http://www.tobaccoresolution.com/
proposedres.html>. See generally John M. Broder, The Tobacco Agreement: The Overview, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 1997, at Al.
2. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 1, at tit. VIII(B)(1).
3. See id. tit. VIII(A)(1).
4. See id. tit. VIII(B) (9), (C)(1).
5. See id. tit. VIII(A)(1).
6. See id. tit. VI.
7. See id. tit. II.
8. See id. tit. I.
9. See id. tit. I(C).
10. See id. preamble, tit. I(A).
11. See Bill Adair, Senate Debates Tobacco Laryers' Fees, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 20,
1998, at A3 (describing a debate about lawyers fees and the cost of cigarettes on the second
day the Senate "lurched into action on the giant tobacco bill.").
12. See Saundra Torry & John Schwartz, Contrite Tobacco Executives Admit Health Risks
Before Congress, WASH. PosT, Jan. 30, 1998, at A14; see also David Phelps, Tobacco Loses Evi-
46 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAw & POLICY
That set the stage for Sen. John R. McCain (R-Az.) to introduce
his version of a tobacco bill in May 1998.3 McCain's bill was much
less appealing from the industry's perspective. The price tag was in-
creased to $520 billion; 4 penalties for not meeting youth smoking
goals were stiffened;1 5 the FDA was granted greater regulatory
power; 16 and 17 new federal boards were proposed.' 7 Most impor-
tant, McCain's bill stripped the industry of the immunities that the
June 1997 settlement had conferred.'" Not surprisingly, the industry
withdrew its consent to the deal.' 9
After much posturing and politicking, and a $40 million advertis-
ing campaign by tobacco companies, the McCain bill was defeated on
June 17, 1998.20 By then it had been weighed down by Democratic
dence Ruling:Judge Orders Release of the 39, 000 Secret Documents, STAR-TRIBUNE, March 8, 1998,
at Al.
13. See Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105 ' Cong. (1998) (hereinafter
"McCain Bill"). Although there are many versions of the McCain Bill, this article refers to
the bill with amendments up to and including May 18, 1998.
14. See John Schwartz, Tobacco Settles Minnesota Suit, WASH. POST, May 9, 1998, at Al
(upon hearing of the Minnesota settlement, McCain commented that the settlement bol-
sters his own efforts to pass his $516 billion tobacco bill); Raja Mishra, Vote May Come
Wednesday, MORNING STAR, March 31, 1998, at IA (stating the terms of McCain's bill are far
harsher than those the industry agreed to in a proposed settlement last year and that the
"deal would cost tobacco companies $160 billion more than the compromise agreement
negotiated last summer by the industry.").
15. See Mishra, supra note 14, at IA. Compare S. 1415 § 205 with Universal Tobacco
Settlement Act, S. 1414, 105th Cong. (1998).
16. See Mishra, supra note 14, at IA; see also S. 1415 §3.
17. See, e.g., S. 1415 § 511 (National Smoking Cessation Program); S. 1415 § 512 (Na-
tional Reduction in Tobacco Usage Program); S. 1414 § 513 (National Tobacco Free
Board); S. 1414 § 514 (National Event Sponsorship Program); S. 1414 § 514 (National
Community Action Program).
18. See Peter Hardin, Bill Offers 'Tough Medicine' - McCain's Proposal Enrages Industry,
RICHMOND TIMES, Apr. 1, 1998, at Al (stating "There's a stark difference between the com-
prehensive tobacco bill proposed this week by Sen. John McCain ... and the settlement
plan struck in June by tobacco companies and representatives of 40 state attorneys general"
including more severe penalties and broader authority of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion over tobacco).
19. SeeJudy Holland, Tobacco Firms Unhappy with New Proposal; Latest Plan Wouldn't Halt
Class Action Suits, SAN FRANcIsCO EXAMINER, Mar. 31, 1998, at A4 (quoting Mississippi Attor-
ney General Michael Moore as predicting "the industry is probably close to walking away"
from a deal, because the payments are much higher than they agreed to in June, and the
penalties for failing to curb youth smoking are much steeper).
20. See Saundra Torry & Juliet Eilperin, GOP Leaders Plan to Offer Leaner Tobacco Propo-
sal, WASH. PosT, June 19, 1998, at Al (having defeated the McCain Bill, House Republicans




amendments to fund other government programs, 21 and Republican
amendments to curb drug use and eliminate the marriage penalty.
22
Where do we go from here? Democrats have announced that
they will attach a McCain-type tobacco bill to other legislation that
reaches the Senate floor.2 3 Senators Orrin G. Hatch (R-Ut.) and Di-
anne Feinstein (D-Ca.) propose to reinstate immunities for the indus-
try while lowering the price tag to $428 billion 24 - still considerably
higher than the 1997 settlement. Rep. Deborah Pryce (R-Oh.), at the
request of Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), drafted a framework for
yet another bill 25 - a loosely defined proposal that excludes immu-
nity but includes these provisions: FDA product regulation, 26 Federal
Trade Commission regulation of advertising,27 anti-smoking and anti-
drug programs, incentives for states to cap legal fees in their Medi-
caid suits, 29 and a federal model law that would punish both retailers
who sell to kids and kids who smoke, by notifying parents, suspending
drivers licenses, and imposing community service.3°
Meanwhile, the industry has settled Medicaid recovery suits in
Florida 3 Mississippi, 3 2 Texas, 33 and Minnesota, 34 for a total of
roughly $40 billion. Medicaid suits are pending in 37 states; Washing-
ton State is next to go to trial (September 1998), then Arizona, Massa-
chusetts, and California in March 1999.3' At the same time, the
industry faces litigation from 12 cities and counties, 38 worker health
funds, 35 Blue Cross plans, 24 classes of smokers who are not yet ill
but fear they will become ill, a class of ill smokers whose trial is cur-
rently underway in Florida, 500 suits for exposure to second-hand
21. See Saundra Torry & Helen Dewar, Senate GOP Kills McCain Tobacco Bill, WASH.
POST, June 18, 1998, at Al.
22. See id. at A18.
23. See Democrats Try to Revive Bill, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, July 15, 1998, at A7.
24. See Kelly Holland, Tobacco: Saving Face, Bus. Wv., July 6, 1998, at 45; see also Judy
Fahys, Hatch Unveils Tobacco-Control Bil4 SALT LAKE TRIB., June 25, 1998, at A10.
25. See Representative Deborah Pryce, Framework for Tobacco Legislation (unpublished
press release) (on file with Journal of Health Care Law & Policy); see also Mark Sherman, GOP
Plans Narrower Tobacco Bill, ATLANTA J. & ATLANTA CONST., June 19, 1998, at Al.





31. See John Schwartz, Cigarette Makers Settle Florida Suit for $11.3 Billion, WASH. POST,
Aug. 26, 1997, at Al.
32. SeeJohn Schwartz & Saundra Torry, Tobacco Firms, Mississippi Settle, WASH. POST, July
4, 1997, at Al.
33. See Tobacco Pact in Texas is Approved by Judge, WASH. PosT, Jan. 23, 1998, at A19.
34. See Schwartz, supra note 14.
35. See id.
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smoke, and a $20 billion claim by the Manville Trust for asbestos-re-
lated cancers where tobacco might have been a contributing factor.16
Finally, an untold number of suits by individual plaintiffs is wait-
ing in the wings. Not a single such suit has succeeded.37 In August
1998, a Florida court awarded $500,000 in compensatory damages and
an equal amount in punitive damages to the estate of a deceased
smoker;" but it was reversed on appeal for want of venue.39 A tempo-
rary victory in 1996, by the same attorney in the same state, was also
reversed by an appellate court, which ruled in part that federally man-
dated warning labels preempt state suits for failure to warn of product
defects. 4°
On the regulatory front, tobacco companies won an important
battle in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on August
14, 1998. 4 1 The prior year, a federal district court in North Carolina,
the nation's biggest tobacco-growing state, had concluded that the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act empowers the FDA to regulate the sale
of tobacco products.42 The lower court had framed the issue as
"whether Congress has evidenced its clear intent to withhold from
FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products."43 According to the
Fourth Circuit, that mischaracterization of the question pervaded the
district court's analysis.44 The appellate court reframed the question
as "whether Congress intended to delegate such jurisdiction to the
FDA."45 The court's answer: a resounding no.46
That brings us up to date as of September 1998. With that back-
ground, Section II of this paper will discuss some of the extraordinary
36. See id; see also Larry Neumeister, Asbestos Fund Trustees Sue Tobacco Firms, WASH. POST,
Jan. 1, 1998, at C4.
37. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV.
853, 854 (1992).
38. See Combined News Services, $1 Mill. Loss for Tobacco, NEWSDAY, June 11, 1998, at
A4.
39. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Widdick, No. 98-894, 1998 WL 476268, at
*1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 1998).
40. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, No. 96-4831, 1998 WL 323484, at
*4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 22, 1998) (reversing and remanding for dismissal because ac-
tion barred by statute of limitations).
41. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food and Drug Admin., No. 97-1604,
1998 WL 473320 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 1998) (holding that FDA regulation of cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco as "medical delivery device" went beyond the scope of the agency's au-
thorization in the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act).
42. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 966 F.Supp. 1374, 1388 (M.D.N.C.
1997).
43. Id. at 1380.
44. See Brown & Williamson, No. 97-1604, 1998 WIL 473320, at *2.
45. Id.
46. See id. at *19.
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events leading up to the June 1997 "Proposed Resolution," and the
provisions of that document relating to money, health and marketing.
Section III will address the "Rights of Litigants." Section IV covers
"Federal Authorization to Regulate Tobacco" - specifically, Con-
gress's power under the Commerce Clause and the Taxing and
Spending Clause. Finally, Section V offers a few "Recommendations"
for resolving the tobacco wars.
As we shall see, the "Proposed Resolution" is a shameful docu-
ment, extorted by public officials who have perverted the rule of law
to tap the deep pockets of a feckless and friendless industry.
Although the agreement may serve the political interests of 40 attor-
neys general and pad the wallets of private lawyers, it is ultimately de-
structive of the health of a free nation.
First, because of a bargain to which they were not even a party,
future claimants may not litigate as a class, sue for punitive damages
covering past acts, or collect compensatory damages in excess of an
agreed upon cap - as a practical matter, they lose the right of access
to the courts.4 7 Second, the U.S. Congress, if it enacts legislation codi-
fying the settlement, will be interceding in product liability cases that
have traditionally been the prerogative of state and local jurisdictions,
thus exercising power beyond that enumerated in the Constitution. 48
Third, states that have manipulated the law in a scheme to fund their
Medicaid programs will be rewarded for their misbehavior.49
If tobacco companies were the only victims, that would be bad
enough; but the unhappy prospect is yet more incursions by a govern-
ment with an insatiable appetite for social engineering - a govern-
ment that seems to have abandoned the principles of free choice and
personal responsibility in favor of regulatory mandates and absolution
for the consequences of volitional acts.
II. PROPOSED RESOLUTION
A. Money
Under the terms of the June 1997 settlement, the tobacco indus-
try will be required to pay approximately $370 billion over 25 years,50
plus a penalty if targeted declines in youth smoking do not material-
ize. 51 Part of the money will fund anti-smoking campaigns, programs
47. See infta Part III.
48. See infra Part IV.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 61-63.
50. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 1, at tit. VI.
51. See id. at it. II.
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to help smokers kick their habit,52 and health care for uninsured chil-
dren.5" Another chunk will reimburse the states for their Medicaid
outlays.54
Some analysts argue that the tobacco companies will simply pass
those costs along to their customers by raising the price per pack of
cigarettes (now roughly $1.90) by as much as 75 cents. 5 Economists
anticipate that sales volume will decline, however, by about 4 percent
for each 10 percent increase in the retail price. 56 If so, a full 75-cent
price hike (roughly 40 percent) would reduce the number of ciga-
rettes sold by about 16 percent. That reduction will mean diminished
government revenues from sales and income taxes, along with higher
unemployment costs as the misfortune of the tobacco manufacturers
predictably spills over to farmers, wholesalers, retailers, the advertising
industry, and promoters of sporting events, to name a few of the inno-
cent bystanders. The costs are uncalculated, and perhaps incalcula-
ble, but nonetheless real and substantial.
Moreover, one must ask why tobacco companies should be re-
sponsible for anti-smoking campaigns and programs to help smokers
break their habit. After all, cigarettes are legal; and the choice to
smoke is freely made. Claims that some consumers are hopelessly ad-
dicted, having relied on fraudulent information and deceptive adver-
tising,57 not only strain credulity but require proof. Such claims
cannot be resolved by legislative fiat or by negotiation under threat of
legal coercion.
Equally objectionable, the industry will be required to finance
health care for uninsured children.5" By what possible logic can that
problem be laid at the doorstep of the tobacco companies? Selling
52. See id. at tit. VII (C)-(D)
53. See ChipJones, $368 Billion Payout, Ad Ban Buys Firms Litigation Shield (last modified
June 21, 1997)<http://www.gateway-va.com/pages/news/tobac/1997/0621toba.htm>.
54. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 1, at tit. preamble.
55. John Mintz, How a $50 Billion "Orphan" Was Adopted: No One Admits Authorship of
GOP Rider, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1997, at Al.
56. See W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking, in 9 TAx
POL'Y & ECON. 51 (James Poterba ed., 1995); see also Kneave Riggall, Comprehensive Tax Base
Theory, Transaction Costs, and Economic Efficiency: How to Tax Our Way to Efficiency, 17 VA. TAx
REv. 295, 305 (1997) (stating that for cigarettes, a sales tax of much more than 10 percent
may be required to reduce demand by 5 percent).
57. See Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective
Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'y REv. 63, 80 (1997) (describing
plaintiffs attorneys burden of proving the tobacco industry's misinformation concerning
nicotine's addictiveness).
58. SeeJones, supra note 53.
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tobacco to children is illegal,5 9 but no one has shown that the tobacco
companies have broken the law.6" To hold a single industry finan-
cially liable because some families are unable or unwilling to insure
their offspring is to impose punishment without notice, without a
trial, and without evidence - it is no more than a bald transfer of
wealth from a disfavored to a favored group.
There is neither legal nor moral justification for industry pay-
ments to reimburse state Medicaid programs. First, in order to fatten
their own coffers, many of the states have simply expunged the re-
quirement that they prove causation.6 1 Instead of having to show in
court that a Medicaid recipient smoked and his smoking was the cause
of his illness, the states need only produce generalized statistics indi-
cating that certain diseases are more prevalent among smokers than
nonsmokers.6 2 Second, authoritative studies have concluded that ex-
cise taxes collected on cigarette sales already exceed the social costs
attributable to smoking.6"
The Medicaid lawsuits that precipitated this settlement6 4 were
created out of whole cloth by states filling the dual and conflicting
roles of lawmaker and plaintiff. Florida set the pattern by enacting a
new statute, 65 allegedly resting on principles of equity, that strips to-
59. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Crimes and Punishments § 404 (1977); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-32-5 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 569.101 (West 1998).
60. See also Margaret A. Boyd, Butt Out! Why the FDA Lacks Jurisdiction to Curb Smoking of
Adolescents and Children, 13J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 169, 175 (1996) (stating that
Philip Morris USA denied retail incentives to merchants fined or convicted of selling ciga-
rettes to minors); see, e.g., Maura Dolan, California and the West Coast Allows Private Suits
Against Tobacco Sales to Minors Laws, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1998, at A3 (stating that criminal
charges are brought against the merchants who sell cigarettes to minors).
61. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9) (West 1994) (amended 1998).
62. See id. (stating in the 1994 statute, "In any action brought under this subsection, the
evidence code shall be liberally construed regarding the issue of causation [which] may be
proven by use of statistical analysis." However, in the recently amended 1998 statute, this
language is deleted.).
63. Viscusi, supra note 56; see also Tiffany S. Griggs, Medicaid Reimbursement From Tobacco
Manufacturers: Is the States Legal Position Equitable?, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 799, 818-19 (1998)
(noting that the aggregate excise tobacco taxes that the states collected over a forty year
period, should approach and perhaps exceed the health care costs for which many states
are now suing to recover from the tobacco industry); see, e.g., William G. Manning, et al.,
The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers and Drinkers Pay their Way?, 261 JAMA 1604, 1608 (1989);JANE
G. GRAVELLE & DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, CIGARETTE TAXES TO FUND HEALTH CARE REFORM: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. No. 94-214E (Mar. 8, 1994).
64. See, e.g., Florida v. American Tobacco Co., No. CL95-1466-AO (Fla. Dist. Ct. filed
Feb. 21, 1995); Massachusetts v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 95-7378 (Mass. Super. Ct. filed
Dec. 19, 1995); Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. CL-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. filed Aug.
18, 1994); Mississippi v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct. filed May 25,
1994).
65. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West 1994) (amended 1998).
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bacco companies of their traditional rights and puts in their place a
shockingly simple rule of law: The state needs money; the industry
has money; so the industry shall give and the state shall take. Under
the new regime, the state can sue tobacco companies directly, without
stepping into the injured party's shoes.6 6 By that sleight-of-hand, Flor-
ida can collect from the industry even when the illness is the smoker's
own fault; the statute abrogates all of the industry's affirmative de-
fenses, including assumption of risk.67 If a smoker happens to be a
Medicaid recipient, individual responsibility is out the window. The
same tobacco company selling the same product to the same person
resulting in the same injury is, magically, liable not to the smoker but
to the state. Liability thus hinges on a smoker's Medicaid status, a
happenstance totally unrelated to any misdeeds by the industry.
A person may not recover for an injury to which he assents. In
both negligence and product liability actions, if a plaintiff is aware of a
condition, knows it to be dangerous, appreciates the extent and na-
ture of the danger, and voluntarily exposes himself to the danger, he
may not hold the defendant liable.68 That time-honored precept has
now been repealed - by statute in Florida,69 and by resort to so-called
equitable doctrine in most of the other states that are suing the to-
bacco companies for Medicaid recovery. What is immeasurably worse,
the repeal is to be applied both retroactively and discriminatorily.
Florida eliminated the industry's assumption-of-risk defense in
1994.7" Yet that defense will be disallowed even for harms allegedly
caused by cigarettes sold decades earlier.7 Moreover, the well-heeled
tobacco industry was the only targeted defendant,72 and the state itself
66. See id. at § (6)(A).
67. See id.
68. SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 487
(5th ed. 1984).
69. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(1) - (6).
70. See id. § 409.910.
71. See Agency for Health Care Admin., et al., v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., et al.,
678 So.2d at 1256 (noting that a cause of action accrues when the State makes a Medicaid
payment to a recipient). The State could not sue to recover Medicaid expenses made
before July 1, 1994, but the cigarettes that caused the illness for which the State made
Medicare expenditures were sold beforeJuly 1, 1994. According to the court, however, the
law was not technically retroactive if applied to "causes of action that accrued after July 1,
1994." Id.
72. Florida governor Lawton Chiles signed an executive order limiting the law's appli-
cation to the tobacco industry. See Mary Ellen Klas, Panel Votes to Void State's Tobacco Law,
PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 29, 1995, at 41 (claiming the order was designed to convince the
state's largest business lobbying group that the bill only allows the state to use the law




- the same state that sponsored the repeal in order to refill its Medi-
caid coffers without enacting a politically unpopular tax increase -
was the single plaintiff to benefit from the new rule.73
What could possibly justify that abuse of power? Incredibly, the
states have contended that they may abrogate affirmative defenses like
assumption of risk because, after all, the state as plaintiff never
smoked.74 Imagine, analogously, that you are exceeding the speed
limit by five miles per hour and hit another car driven by a Medicaid
recipient; he is driving 80 miles per hour, intoxicated, and hurtles
through a red light. When the state Medicaid program sues you for
negligence, you properly respond that the other driver was 99% at
fault. The state counters that the Medicaid recipient's behavior is ir-
relevant; the state doesn't drink, nor does it drive. Such arrant non-
sense - the exact equivalent of "the state never smoked" - is
unworthy of serious consideration.
A handful of private attorneys - later to be hired at contingency
fees ranging from 10 to 25 percent of the recovered damages - were
responsible for the novel legal theorizing that became the Florida stat-
ute and the model for the other states.7 5 Those members of the plain-
tiffs' bar are now hopelessly conflicted, serving as government sub-
contractors with financial incentives geared to the magnitude of their
conquest. They are driven by the contemplation of a huge payoff
while, at the same time, they fill a quasi-prosecutorial role in which
their overriding objective is supposedly to seek justice.
What is worse, contingency fee contracts were awarded without
competitive bidding to attorneys who often bankrolled state political
campaigns." In Mississippi, attorney general Mike Moore selected his
number one campaign contributor, Richard Scruggs, to lead the
Medicaid recovery suit.77 In Texas, attorney general Dan Morales
chose five firms for the state's multibillion-dollar tobacco litigation;
four of the five firms contributed a total of nearly $150,000 to Morales
from 1990 to 1995.78
73. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(1) (West 1994) (amended 1998) (stating that, "... it
is the intent of the Legislature that Medicaid be repaid in full and prior to any person,
program, or entity"). It is important to note that Florida ultimately settled its tobacco case
for $11.3 billion. SeeJohn Kennedy, Tobacco to Pay State $11.3 Billion: The Industry Avoided a
Trial by Settling with Florida and Agreeing to Admit Cigarettes are Addictive and Deadly, ORLANDO
SENT., Aug. 26, 1997, at Al.
74. See generally Griggs, supra note 63, at 808, 814.
75. See Michael Orey, Fanning the Flames, 18 AM. LAWYER No. 3, 9 (1996).
76. See Carolyn Lochhead, The Growing Power of Trial Lawyers, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 23,
1996, at 21.
77. See id. at 22.
78. See id. at 23.
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In West Virginia, tobacco defendants successfully challenged the
state's contingency fee contract. 79 Attorney general Darrell McGraw
had hand-picked six lawyers, without competitive bidding, and de-
clined to specify his selection criteria."° He did say, however, that "the
State and her citizens stand only to benefit. The State has no expo-
sure. There are no lawyer hourly fees. There are no costs. The tax-
payers are thus fully protected."81  He could have propounded a
similar argument if the state were to hire private lawyers to prosecute
criminal eases, and only pay for convictions. But defendants as well as
taxpayers must be protected. The Supreme Court reminds us that an
attorney for the state "is the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impar-
tially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all."82
Notwithstanding the Court's admonition, the Medicaid suits fash-
ioned by state attorneys general and their allies in the private bar ret-
roactively eradicate settled legal doctrine and deny due process to a
single industry selected more for its financial resources and current
public image than for its legal culpability. The implications in the
future for other industries and even for individuals should be plain.
That destruction of the rule of law must be stopped or none of us, in
time, will be secure. The mark of a free society is how it treats not its
most but its least popular members. Today it is tobacco companies.
Tomorrow it could be anyone.
B. Health
The "Proposed Resolution" authorizes the FDA to regulate nico-
tine as a drug and, after the year 2009, to ban nicotine altogether.8"
Conspicuous warnings on each pack will advise smokers that cigarettes
are addictive, cause cancer, and can kill.84 Tobacco companies will
have to disclose harmful ingredients and research to the FDA, and
79. See McGraw v. American Tobacco Co., Civ. No. 94-C-1707 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 1995).
80. See Jack Deutsch, Study Doubts Success of Tobacco Suits, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Sept.
20, 1994, at 1A (alleging that McGraw named three attorneys who had contributed to his
campaign).
81. See McGraw v. American Tobacco Co., Civ. No. 94-C-1707, Memorandum in Oppo-
sition to Defendants' Joint Motion to Prohibit Prosecution of Action Due to Plaintiff's Un-
lawful Retention of Counsel (Cir. Ct. Kanauha County).
82. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
83. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 1, at tit. I; but cf Lyle Denniston, FDA's Tobacco
Rules Voided, BALT. SUN, Aug. 15, 1998, at IA. The FDA's power to regulate tobacco has
been recently called into question. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco v. Food and Drug
Admin., No. 97-1604, 1998 WL 473320 *1, *19 (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 1998).
84. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 1, at tit. I(B) (1).
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smoking will be prohibited in most public places and in the
workplace."5
Those provisions could be just the tip of the iceberg, of course,
with tobacco merely the first and easiest victim. Right around the cor-
ner could be similar restrictions on alcohol, coffee, chocolate, diet
drinks, dairy products, red meat, fast food, sugar, sporting equipment,
cars - you name it. Proposals from supposedly intelligent people in
positions of responsibility include grading foods for their fat content,
taxing them proportionately, and using the tax revenues for public
bike paths and exercise trails. When decisions about the products we
choose to consume are entrusted to an unelected and unaccountable
bureaucracy, personal freedom is inescapably at risk.
Arguably, we might ask the government to serve as a gatherer of,
and repository for, the data that are necessary to facilitate voluntary
and informed consumer transactions (although there is no apparent
reason why the private sector couldn't better perform that function).
But once we relegate such choices to the state, we should not be sur-
prised by pernicious side effects, including a flourishing black market,
rampant and organized crime, and a backlash among rebellious
teens.8 6 A war on tobacco will produce no better results than our end-
less war on drugs, or Prohibition before that.8 v Instead of forays into
South American countries to destroy their coca fields, we could find
ourselves combing the back roads of North Carolina searching for to-
bacco farmers.
We never seem to learn. States hike their cigarette taxes and the
result is rampant smuggling, not just from low-tax neighboring
states,88 but from military bases, Indian reservations, even exports to
Mexico that are smuggled back into the U.S. 9 After Canada raised its
excise tax, smuggled cigarettes accounted for an estimated 30 to 50
85. See id.
86. SeeJon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1298-1301 (1998) (recognizing that some
form of black market arises when the state regulates an industry and prices increase sub-
stantially as a result).
87. See Doug Dandow, War On Drugs or War On America , 3 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 242,
242 (1991) (prohibiting drugs has only spawned record numbers of murders and high
rates of property crimes, made the use of drugs more dangerous and pushed users toward
deadlier substances).
88. See Daniel K. Benjamin & William R. Dougan, Efficient Excise Taxation: The Evidence
From Cigarettes, 40J.L. & ECON. 113, 117 (1997) (stating that almost as soon as states levied
taxes on cigarettes, resulting interstate tax discrepancies created incentives for interstate
smuggling).
89. DWIGHT R. LEE, WILL GOVERNMENT'S CRUSADE AGAINST TOBACCO LAST? 2-4 (Center
for Study of Am. Bus. Contemporary Issues Series 86, 1997).
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percent of consumption; so Canada was forced to lower the tax to
keep smuggled cigarettes away from children.9 °
It doesn't take a rocket scientist, an FDA commissioner, or a sur-
geon general to know that the proposed tobacco settlement will inevi-
tably foment illegal dealings dominated by criminal gangs hooking
underage smokers on an adulterated product freed of all constraints
on quality and price that competitive markets usually afford. The de-
structive effect on our nation's health - lamentable but not surpris-
ing - will undoubtedly be accompanied by an ever more expanding
and intrusive government.
Moreover, researchers have pointed out that smokers respond to
nicotine reductions by smoking more, puffing harder, or even physi-
cally altering the filters that are intended to dilute the smoke
stream.9 Washington State attorney general Christine Gregoire re-
minds us that "people aren't dying because of nicotine. It's the other
stuff," she said, referring to the carcinogens present in tar and
smoke.92 And Gregory Connelly, director of the Massachusetts To-
bacco Control Program, cautions that anti-smoking crusades may
backfire, as apparently happened in Massachusetts where teenage
smoking rose by 10 percent in the first three years of Connelly's $35
million-a-year campaign.13 "Among kids, you get a backlash anytime
Big Brother goes after them," Connelly observed.94
If the health imperative is to reduce smoking among teenagers,
we have the requisite tools at our disposal; but they do not include
either command and control agency regulations orjudicially enforced
consent decrees. The sale of cigarettes to youngsters is illegal in every
state.95 Those laws must be vigorously enforced. Retailers who violate
90. Smuggling from the U.S. to Canada was triggered by a Canadian government in-
crease in the excise tax on cigarettes to $4.44 a pack. See W. Kip Viscusi, Promoting Smokers'
Welfare with Responsible Taxation, 47 NAT'L TAxJ. 547, 555 (1994).
91. SeeJohn Schwartz, Tobacco Pact's Fine Print Limits Action on Nicotine, WASH. POST, July
8, 1997, at A4.
92. See id.
93. Marc Fisher & John Schwartz, Trying to Snuff Out the Tobacco Culture, WASH. POST,
June 22, 1997, at Al. In 1992, Massachusetts voters approved a referendum which raised
the cigarette tax 25 cents to fund a program targeted at reducing teen smoking. See Bob
Hohler, U.S. Examines State's Youth Tobacco Effort, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1995, at 3. The
Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program is part of the Massachusetts Department of Public
Health. See id.
94. See Fisher & Schwartz, supra note 93, at Al.
95. See Donald W. Garner & Richard J. Whitney, Protecting Children from Joe Camel and
His Friends: A New First Amendment and Federal Preemption Analysis of Tobacco Billboard Regula-
tion, 46 EMORY L.J. 479, 479 (1997) (stating that a federal law requires all states to pass and
enforce laws prohibiting sales of cigarettes to minors in order to qualify for federal block
grants to curb substance abuse); see alsoJennifer McCullough, Lighting Up the Battle Against
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the law must be prosecuted. Proof of age requirements are appropri-
ate if administered objectively and reasonably. Vending machine sales
should be prohibited in areas like arcades and schools where children
are the principal clientele. And minors - who are often held respon-
sible as adults when charged with a serious crime - should at least
have their wrists slapped when caught smoking or attempting to ac-
quire cigarettes. Among the obvious remedies available to state au-
thorities: inform the parents of would-be smokers. Parenting is, after
all, the primary responsibility of moms and pops, not the federal
government.
Improved health for our children is an objective that no reason-
able person could gainsay. But make no mistake, dollars and cents -
not health issues - are the driving force behind the tobacco settle-
ment. When their own money is on the line, both federal and state
governments opt for financial health over smokers' health. Facing ill-
ness claims by military personnel to whom the U.S. government had
dispensed cigarettes free of charge, Veterans Affairs secretary Jesse
Brown told the former soldiers to pay their own freight for having
chosen to smoke.96 When sued by a prisoner who was denied a nico-
tine patch for the habit he developed in a Florida jail, the state
pleaded that it was no more responsible for his purchase of cigarettes
than for his "buying a candy bar at the canteen."97 If that principle
renders the government immune from liability, it renders private
companies immune as well.
Florida is especially culpable when it comes to smokers' health.
Over nearly a decade, the state manufactured cigarettes and dis-
pensed them to its prison population. For good measure and not a
little revenue, the state sold some of its cigarettes to local jurisdic-
tions.9 9 More recently, Florida invested $825 million of its pension
assets in tobacco stocks."' ° And most hypocritically of all, when a two-
vote margin in Congress ensured that federal tobacco subsidies would
the Tobacco Industry: New Regulations Prohibiting Cigarette Sales to Minors, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 709,
727 (1997) (stating that forty-six states and D.C. passed statutes prohibiting cigarette sales
to minors).
96. See Bill McAllister, Smoking by GI's Raises Liability Issue at the VA, WASH. POST, Apr. 24,
1997, at Al.
97. See Waugh v. Singletary, Case No. 95-CVC-J-20 (D. Fla. July 11, 1995).
98. See Milo Geyelin, Florida Made, Gave Out Prison Cigarettes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1997,
at B12.
99. See id.
100. See Florida Pension Fund to Unload Tobacco Stocks, REUTERS FIN. SERV., May 28, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (stating that not until late May 1997 did Flor-
ida's pension trustees order the state's portfolio managers to liquidate tobacco
stockholdings).
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be renewed, 10 of the state's 23 representatives voted for renewal."t '
On one hand, Florida bemoans the ill health of its citizens and blames
tobacco companies; on the other hand, the state produces and sells
cigarettes, provides equity capital for Philip Morris, and helps subsi-
dize tobacco farmers.
There is but one legitimate argument for holding tobacco com-
panies liable notwithstanding a consumer's decision to smoke: A
smoker is not free to choose if he is misled by fraudulent advertising
or if he is addicted as a minor and unable to quit once he is capable of
appreciating the risks.
Still, more than 40 million people have quit.t0 2 In Florida's mo-
tion to dismiss a 1995 lawsuit by a prisoner for a smoking-related ill-
ness, the state acknowledges that "whether nicotine is addictive or not
is a gray area. You have as many in the medical field that say it is as
that say it isn't."'0 3 And tobacco critic, Richard Kluger, concedes:
Whether one categorizes smoking as a practice, a habit, an
indulgence, a vice, a dependency, or an addiction, it was
commonly known - and had been for decades - to be
hard to stop once begun. Nor could anyone say for certain
how much of a daily dose served to induce addiction; toler-
ance differed from person to person, and the industry had in
fact made available brands with extremely low dosages. How,
then, to justify a claim that the cigarette makers had mas-
sively imposed an intentionally addicting product on an in-
nocent public that had little knowledge or choice in the
matter. 1
0 4
It is not enough to show that tobacco industry statements and
advertisements were deceptive. A plaintiff must also demonstrate that
he relied upon the misinformation. The hazards of tobacco were well-
documented, however, from sources outside the industry as long as
400 years ago.' 05 Indeed, throughout this century incessant warnings
have emanated from thousands of health publications, medical pro-
fessionals, and government entities."0 6 By the 1920s, fourteen states
101. See House Votes, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY no. 233, H.R. 3603 at 1720 (June 15, 1996)
(prohibiting $25 million in funds from the tobacco programs to pay salaries of personnel
who provide tobacco-related extension services for tobacco crop insurance).
102. Sandra G. Boodman, Feeding the Nicotine Habit, WASH. PosT, June 30, 1998, at Z10.
103. See Waugh v. Singletary, Case No. 95-CVC-J-20 (D. Fla. July 11, 1995).
104. See Richard Kluger, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE
PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 760 (1996).
105. See id. at 15.
106. See Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Liability, in
SMOKING POLICY: LAw, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 112 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
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had actually prohibited cigarettes."17 Printed health warnings ap-
peared on every pack of cigarettes lawfully sold in the United States
for the past thirty years." °' To be unaware of the danger of tobacco is
to have been hopelessly oblivious.
In any event, those are the claims and counterclaims that should
be resolved in court; they are not resolved by secret negotiations or by
congressional fiat. Our adversarial system - including evidence, trial,
and jury verdict - must be permitted to function. Smokers, insur-
ance companies, and the industry should fight it out, applying tradi-
tional principles of tort law. State Medicaid systems may sue like any
other insurer, 0 9 but they are subject to the assumption-of-risk defense
and they must prove case-by-case causation and damages. If a plaintiff
can show that he was defrauded, otherwise unaware, and addicted by
the industry's deception, then he should prevail. But the rules must
be objective and evenhanded, the same rules applied against any
other defendant.
Congress would do well to heed the advice of former Sen. George
McGovern, who knew firsthand the ravages of addiction, having lost
his daughter to alcoholism. 1 0 Sen. McGovern points to "those who
would deny others the choice to eat meat, wear fur, drink coffee or
simply eat extra-large portions of food."1 ' 1  He cautions that "the
choices we make may be foolish or self-destructive [but] there is still
the overriding principle that we cannot allow the micromanaging of
each other's lives .... [Wihen we no longer allow those choices, both
civility and common sense will have been diminished." '12
Sugarman eds., 1993) (finding that warnings concerning the scientific relationship be-
tween smoking and lung cancer were first published in medical journals not widely read by
the general public; however, news spread through magazines such as Reader's Digest and
television programs which began devoting time to inform the public of the health risks of
smoking).
107. See Kluger, supra note 104, at 39 (noting that by the end of the 19th century there
were 3 states that banned the sale of cigarettes and by 1901, 12 more states considered such
laws). State bars to cigarette sales declined by the 1920's; Kansas in 1927 became the last
state to drop such a ban. See id. at 69.
108. See Federal Cigarette Labeling zind Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1331).
109. See FiA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(1) (West 1994) (amended 1998).
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C. Marketing
The proposed settlement is draconian in its restrictions on adver-
tising and merchandising. Vending machine sales are prohibited.113
Text-only, black-and-white ads are the rule, except in adult publica-
tions. " Billboards and store signs facing the street are proscribed.' 15
Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man are history, as are other cartoon
and human advertising images; no more merchandise with company
logos; no more sponsorship of athletic events.116
Yet, one might ask, if the tobacco companies voluntarily entered
into a settlement agreement and chose to waive certain rights under
the First Amendment, why shouldn't we respect and support their de-
cision? The answer is two-part.
First, the proposed settlement requires that non-participating
and future tobacco companies - which will not be immunized
against class actions and punitive damages if they do not consent to
the settlement - place substantial sums in escrow for 35 years to en-
sure that potential future liabilities will be paid. 1 7 Harvard Professor
Laurence H. Tribe blithely dismisses that extortion with a declaration
that "Congress is entitled to ensure that non-participating companies
will not become judgment-proof.""' He provides no substantiation,
despite the constitutional concerns that such an escrow provision
clearly raises under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, the prohibition on bills of attainder, and the Takings
Clause. 1' 9
Second, with respect to companies that participated in the settle-
ment, their involvement and signature by no means equates to "con-
sent." Over four decades, after thousands of claims, not one dollar of
113. See Proposed Resolution supra note 9 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 1, at tit. I(A).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. supra note 1, at tit. III(C).
118. See Testimony of Laurence H. Tribe on the Global Tobacco Settlement, Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 105 ' Cong. 11 (1997) (hereinafter Tribe Testimony) (statement of Laurence
H. Tribe, Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School).
119. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating that the Due Process Clause provides
in part, that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..."; the Equal Protection Clause
provides that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall deny to any person within
its jurisdiction, equal protection of the laws"); U.S. CONST. amend. V (discussing the Tak-
ings Clause as providing that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation"); U.S. CONsT. art. I §§ 9 and 10 (prohibiting both the federal and state
governments from passing any legislative act which applies either to named individuals or
to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
without a judicial trial).
[VOL. 2:45
TOBACCO WARS
damages has been paid by the industry for a smoking-related ill-
ness.' 20 Juries have understood - even if state attorneys general have
not - that we are free to consume whatever legal products we wish,
but having done so, we must bear the consequences.
As juries were reaffirming that basic rule of law, state Medicaid
programs were coming under intense financial pressure.' 21  Of
course, states were entitled to sue the tobacco companies for recovery
of Medicaid outlays supposedly traceable to smoking, 122 but the states
bore the same burden of proof as the injured party and they were
subject to the same defenses - including assumption of risk.1 23 Un-
willing to raise taxes, and unable to prevail in court, the states came
up with a creative solution: they simply eliminated assumption of risk
as a defense in Medicaid recovery suits and, for good measure, ap-
plied the new rule retroactively.' 24
While they were at it, to head off any possibility of an adverse jury
verdict, the states abolished the requirement for proof of individual
causation.' 25 Instead of demonstrating that a particular claimant's ill-
ness was caused by his smoking, all the states had to produce were
aggregate statistics showing that certain injuries were more prevalent
among smokers than nonsmokers.' 26 So tobacco companies, under
the new regimen, would have to pay for such things as burn victims
who fell asleep with a lit cigarette, cancer victims who never smoked,
and even Medicaid recipients who defrauded the system and weren't
120. SeeJana Schrink Strain, Medicaid Versus the Tobacco Industry: A Reasonable Legislative
Solution to a State's Financial Woes?, 30 IND. L. REv. 851, 858 (1997). Strain noted that the
industry had lost only twice. Id. In the first case, a jury verdict against the Liggett Group,
was affirmed by the Third Circuit, but the damage award of $400,000 was overturned. Id.
(citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F.Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988); affd in part, revd in
part, 843 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1990)). In another case against Brown & Williamson, a jury
awarded the plaintiff $750,000. Id. (citing Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
No. 95-934-CA CV-B (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 5, 1996), cert. denied, 680 So.2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)). The jury verdict was overturned on appeal. See supra note 40 and accompa-
nying text.
121. See generally id. (describing the enormous amount of Medicaid dollars spent on
smoking-related illnesses and the state's attempts to recoup these expenditures from the
tobacco companies).
122. See id. at 864.
123. See generally Alan L. Calnan, Distributive and Corrective Justice: Issues in Contemporary
Tobacco Litigation, 27 S.W.U.L. REV. 577, 663-664, 667 (1998) (stating that state reimburse-
ment claims against tobacco manufacturers are really "private tort actions"); Griggs, supra
note 63, at 807.
124. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West 1994) (amended 1998); see also Tucker S.
Player, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global Settlement, and the Future of Tobacco Litiga-
tion, 49 S.C.L. REv. 311, 317 (1998).
125. See Player, supra note 124, at 318.
126. See id.
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injured at all. Astonishingly, no corroborating evidence need be
furnished.
Naturally, the states laughed off the charge that the new law
wiped out the industry's defenses. Mississippi's lawyer said, for exam-
ple, "It doesn't mean that the tobacco industry is defenseless. They
[sic] can show that the state has unclean hands, that the state has
participated in the activity somehow." '27 Yes, unclean hands is a legiti-
mate defense, 28 but when the time came to test that defense, the
states went to still greater lengths to corrupt the law and tilt the play-
ing field. Here's what happened.
Florida's Medicaid recovery suit commenced on Friday, August 1,
1997.29 The state's attorney bemoaned the "carnage" from smoking,
which he laid at the door of the tobacco companies.13 0 In its defense,
the industry had identified several examples of Florida's unclean
hands."3' As noted above, the state had voted for a continuation of
federal tobacco support programs,1 3 2 invested $825 million of its pen-
sion assets in tobacco stocks,13 3 and manufactured cigarettes for sale
to local jurisdictions. 4 and distribution to prisoners.1 35 When the in-
dustry sought to introduce that evidence, the state filed a motion to
suppress, and the state judge granted the motion.3 6 So much for the
unclean hands defense.
Faced with insurmountable legal hurdles in dozens of Medicaid
suits, the industry decided to negotiate. 13 7 Was the settlement consen-
sual? Ask yourself why an industry would agree to disgorge $370 bil-
lion, subject itself to FDA regulation, overhaul its advertising,
eliminate vending machine sales, and pay large penalties if targeted
reductions in youth smoking were not realized - all in return for
127. See Richard Scruggs, Remarks at the National Conference on Civil Justice and the
Litigation Process to the Federalist Society 188 (Sept. 12, 1996).
128. See id.




132. See Boodman, supra note 102, at 1720.
133. See supra note 101.
134. See Geyelin, supra note 98, at B12.
135. See id.
136. See Stephen Rothman, Tobacco Industry Defense Move Curbed by Fa. Judge, REUTERS,
Feb. 3, 1997 available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
137. See Broder, supra note 1, at Al.
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partial immunity from litigation that had not cost a single dollar of
damages in forty years.
138
Because the market price of tobacco stocks advanced whenever
the settlement appeared to move forward, some argued that the settle-
ment must be good for the industry.139 That argument betrays a
profound confusion about the alternatives realistically available.
Either tobacco companies could agree to the settlement or they could
mount an expensive, time-consuming, and ultimately futile challenge
to nearly forty Medicaid recovery suits under a perverted system of law
that effectively foreclosed every line of defense. Confronting those
choices, it is no surprise that the industry elected to bargain, and it is
no surprise that the stock market reacted positively.
Yes, the settlement was perceived as good for the companies,
compared to enormous losses at the hands of state attorneys general
and their allies among the plaintiffs' bar - together wielding the
sword of government in a manner so outrageous as to threaten the
liberty of any deep-pocketed industry that might stand in their path.
To call this settlement consensual is consummate doublespeak.
Without consent, the advertising restrictions in the proposed set-
tlement would never have passed First Amendment scrutiny.14 ° After
all, commercial speech is constitutionally shielded, albeit to a lesser
degree than political speech.14 t But it doesn't require a constitutional
scholar to conclude that the proposed rules are ridiculous. We treat
flag burning and KKK orations as protected speech. 142 We even insu-
late "gangsta rap" from the censors, despite its message to youngsters
that the drug culture is admirable and killing police officers is a plea-
138. See McCullough, supra note 95, at 714 (stating that no tobacco company offered to
settle a case in over thirty-five years of litigation).
139. See CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO 143-144 (1998).
140. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(holding that even purely commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection).
141. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (holding that non-misleading commercial speech about a lawful activity cannot be
regulated unless: 1) the government has a substantial interest in doing so; 2) the regula-
tion directly and materially serves that interest; 3) the regulation is reasonable and no
more extensive than necessary to achieve the desired objective). More recently, in 44 Li-
quormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, the Court declared that even "vice" products like alcoholic
beverages are entitled to commercial speech protection. 116 U.S. 1495 (1996). Moreover,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp. cautioned that adult discourse
may not be dictated by what is fit for children. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
142. See Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the burning of the Ameri-
can Flag is an expression of free speech protected under the First Amendment); R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 507 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that the burning of a cross is an
expression of free speech that does not fall within the fighting words exception and thus is
protected' under the First Amendment).
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surable recreational activity.' 43 Yet if Tiger Woods shows up wearing a
sports jacket emblazoned with Joe Camel, our new speech guardians
will see to it that the executives of R.J. Reynolds are held accountable.
Given the types of expressive communication that receive undiluted
First Amendment aegis despite their minimal social utility, the restric-
tions on tobacco advertising in general and Joe Camel in particular
are quite simply unfathomable.
To be sure, critics of the industry point to the impact of tobacco
ads on credulous, uninformed, and innocent teenagers.1 44 But the
debate is not whether teens smoke; they do. It's not whether smoking
is bad for them; it is. The real question is whether there is a link
between tobacco advertising and the decision by children to begin
smoking or to increase their consumption. There is no evidence to
establish that link.145 The primary purpose of cigarette advertising is
to persuade smokers of one brand to switch to another.1 46 Six Euro-
pean countries that have banned all tobacco ads have since seen over-
all consumption increase - probably because health risks are no
longer documented in the banned ads. 147 In the United States, every
relaxation of the restrictions on promoting health-related product im-
provements has generated a blizzard of ads, "healthy" competition for
market share, and significant declines in tar and nicotine content. 
148
Not surprisingly, whenever health claims are outlawed, the industry
promotes imagery and endorsements, the very ads that anti-smoking
zealots decry. We need more health-based ads, not fewer.
Even if we accept the argument that the tobacco companies have
targeted underage prospects, they surely have not accomplished their
objective. Over the 1985-95 decade, during the heyday of Joe Camel,
the percentage of kids aged 12-17 who smoke dropped from 29 per-
143. See Luke Records v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that the plain-
tiff had failed to prove that a Luther Campbell "rap" song was obscene).
144. See generally Kelder & Daynard, supra note 57, at 65-66.
145. See Robert D. Bobrow, The First Amendment: Oasis or Mirage for Old Joe Camel, 34 U.
LOUISVILLEJ. FAM. L. 963, 984-985 (1996) (arguing that a causal connection between the
advertising and children smoking is required for the government to ban cigarette ads);
Gregory D. Bassok, Advertising Rights and Industry Fights: A Constitutional Analysis of Tobacco
Advertising Restrictions in a Federal Legislative Settlement of Tobacco Industry Litigation, 85 GEO.
L.J. 715, 731 (1997) (arguing that the causal relationship between tobacco advertising and
children smoking is at best "tenuous" and cannot justify the silencing of the
advertisements).
146. See, e.g., John E. Calfee, The Ghost of Cigarette Advertising Past, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec.
1986, at 35, 36 (stating, "The purpose of health advertising was to distinguish one brand
from the competition .... ").
147. Michael J. Stewart, The Effect of Advertising Bans on Tobacco Consumption in OECD
Countries, 12 INT'L. J. ADVERTISING 155-80 (1993).
148. See Calfee, supra note 146, at 37-39.
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cent to 20 percent.'49 Taking a longer term view, the average age of
first-time regular cigarette users has neither advanced nor declined
from 1962 through the latest 1994 data.15 ° And inner-city teens report
that they are cynical about, even resentful of, cigarette ads; the per-
centage of minority youngsters who regularly smoke has plummeted
over the past 10 years.' 51 Although some ads may have succeeded in
gaining brand share, they have been singularly unsuccessful in ex-
panding the overall market, especially among children. 15 2
III. RIGHTS OF LITIGANTS
Traditional principles of tort law enable injured persons to liti-
gate to try to shift their losses to the party allegedly responsible for the
losses.1 53 Although states may make marginal changes in that law,
they may not take steps that in the aggregate cut into the core of a
litigant's rights. 15
4
As part of the Proposed Resolution, tobacco companies will be ex-
empt from all punitive damages for past conduct' 55 and immune from
any new class action lawsuits. 15' The industry will not be exempt from
suits by individuals;157 but those individuals, if successful, will nonethe-
less be subject to an aggregate annual cap on compensatory damages
of roughly $5 billion, with a carry-forward claim permitted if the cap is
exceeded in any given year. 158
Arguably, the proposed $5 billion annual cap on compensatory
damages will have little practical effect: in over 40 years of litigation by
smokers and their families, not one final adjudication of damages
against a tobacco company has resulted. 159 Jurors understand - even
149. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES: WASHINGTON, D.C., PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES FROM THE 1995
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE 68 (1996).
150. See id. at 99.
151. See Amy Goldstein, Experts Uncertain Why Black Youths Shunning Cigarettes, DETROIT
NEWS, Aug. 21, 1995, at A8.
152. See generally Kelder & Daynard, supra note 57 at 66 (discussing the percentages of
teens that smoke particular brands as being as follows: Marlboro (60%); Newport (13%);
Camel (13%); other (24%)).
153. See 86 C.J.S. Torts § 2 (1997).
154. For the moment, I put aside that it is the federal Congress, not the states, that is
asked to legislate the terms of the settlement. That overriding fact - one that implicates
enumerated powers and federalism concerns - is addressed in the next section. See infra
Part IV.
155. Proposed Resolution, supra note 1, at tit. VIII(B)(1).
156. Id. at tit. VIII(A)(1).
157. See id. at tit. VIII(B)(2), (C)(1).
158. See id. at tit. VIII(B) (9); see also Broder, supra note 1, at Al.
159. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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if most of the state attorneys general seem not to - that free people
may choose the products they wish to consume; but having made their
choice, those people are responsible for the consequences. 60 Never-
theless, with the recent discovery of inculpatory industry docu-
ments,' 61 plaintiffs may be able to prove that they were deceived.
Fraudulent misrepresentation, if relied upon, deprives consumers of
an opportunity to make informed judgments, in which case an indus-
try defense based on assumption of risk is negated. 162 Such claims
and counterclaims are best resolved by ajury, however, unimpeded by
a limit on compensatory damages.
With respect to class actions, their prohibition as part of a negoti-
ated settlement might also have only minor consequence - at least in
federal court. Two recent Supreme Court cases make it more difficult
for plaintiffs' attorneys to file tobacco class actions. 63 In Metro-North,
the Court held that a plaintiff who had been exposed to asbestos, but
had contracted no disease, could not collect for "negligent infliction
of emotional distress" or "medical monitoring" under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act.164 Many tobacco class actions have demanded
medical monitoring expenses even though plaintiffs had no physical
illness and no symptoms; their only alleged injury was an addiction to
tobacco. 65
In a second asbestos case, known as Georgine,166 the Court con-
cluded that a common interest in settling claims is not enough to cer-
tify a class if the named plaintiffs could not fairly represent other class
members at trial.'67 While courts can consider a settlement as one
factor in deciding whether to certify, the requirements of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' 68 must be satisfied.' 69 It would
160. See Rabin, supra note 37, at 871.
161. See Phelps, supra note 12, at Al.
162. See Rabin, supra note 37, at 871.
163. See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. 2113 (1997); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
164. Metro-North, 117 S. Ct. at 2121-22.
165. See, e.g., Gale Norton, Testimony Regarding the Civil Liability Provisions of the Pro-
posed National Tobacco Settlement before the SenateJudiciary Committee (Mar. 6, 1998)
(transcript available from Federal Document Clearinghouse, Inc.) (stating, "Class actions
against the tobacco companies based on addiction and dependence claims, which seek
funding for smoking cessation programs or medical monitoring for smokers who have not
yet manifested a tobacco-related disease, are an effective mechanism and have been certi-
fied by several courts.").
166. Amchem Prods., 117 S. Ct. at 2237.
167. See id. at 2250.
168. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(a), (b):
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
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appear, therefore, that the prospects for a court-approved class to-
bacco settlement are now less likely in federal court. Any such settle-
ment would have the same certification problems that the Court
criticized in Georgine, but on a far broader scale.17 ° The asbestos set-
tlement involved 250,000 plaintiffs nationwide;' 7 ' a tobacco class
could include millions of claimants with diverse illnesses, smoking
habits, and awareness of the risks - not to mention a greater varia-
tion in employment, weight, age, diet, other lifestyle choices, family
history, education, wealth, and exposure to other causal agents. In
short, plaintiffs' lawyers will likely have a much tougher time ob-
taining class certification to litigate diverse claims that should proba-
bly be litigated separately.
Of course, state courts have been far more willing to certify plain-
tiffs' classes of unmanageable size, divergent interests, and varying in-
juries.1 72 Moreover, it is one thing to require attorneys to be more
thatjoinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or im-
pede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gen-
erally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive re-
lief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually con-
trolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by
or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of con-
centrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the diffi-
culties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
169. See Amchem Prods., 117 S. Ct. at 2249.
170. See id. at 2252.
171. See id. at 2237.
172. See Suein L. Hwang & Ann Davis, Secondhand-Smoke Case May Kindle New Suits, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 13, 1997, at Bl. Broin v. Philip Morris, Inc. involved a national class of 60,000
airline flight attendants suing for alleged damages due to secondhand smoke. Id. The
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careful in structuring a class of plaintiffs; it is quite another to prohibit
class actions altogether. The cumulative effect of foreclosing class ac-
tions, rejecting punitive damages, and capping compensatory dam-
ages could so exhaust an attorney's incentive to litigate that claimants
with legitimate grievances are denied their day in court.
In 1987, the Supreme Court restated its long held position that
"those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in
and of the essence of the system of trial by jury, are placed beyond the
reach of the legislature. "173 We cannot know with certainty what as-
pects of trial by jury the Court considers essential. Nonetheless, when
a plaintiff may not bring suit as a member of a class, when he cannot
collect punitive damages, when any compensatory damages might be
subject to an upper limit, when because of those combined con-
straints his prospect of attracting skilled legal assistance is materially
diminished, and when he must confront a well-financed and compe-
tently represented defendant, it strains credulity to suggest that his
right to trial by jury has not been fundamentally compromised.
That same accumulation of obstacles may also deprive a litigant
of due process. 174 The Supreme Court has been somewhat more
forthcoming in its musings on that possibility. When a surviving
spouse sued under the Workmen's Compensation Law following her
husband's death in a work-related accident, the Court remarked that
damages available under the Act were limited, then volunteered that
"[t]he scheme of the act is so wide a departure from common-law
standards . . . that doubts naturally have been raised respecting its
constitutional validity." '175 In that instance, the Court found no consti-
tutional infirmity because the employee, although "no longer able to
recover as much as before.., is entitled to moderate compensation in
all cases of injury, and has a certain and speedy recovery. ' 76
The Court pondered whether "a state might, without violence to
the constitutional guaranty of 'due process of law,' suddenly set aside
all common-law rules respecting liability. . . without providing a rea-
settlement agreement called for tobacco companies to pay $349 million - of which $300
million was for further research and $49 million was for expenses and fees for the class
attorneys. See id. The plaintiffs received nothing!
173. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987) (citations omitted) (holding that
the 7th Amendment guarantees a jury trial to determine defendant's liability under the
Clean Water Act).
174. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating "nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; . . .").
175. New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 196 (1917).
176. Id. at 201.
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sonably just substitute."' 77 Then, after explaining that the case at
hand did not require resolution of that question, the Court conjec-
tured that "it perhaps may be doubted whether the state could abolish
all rights of action.. . without setting up something adequate in their
stead."
178
Applying a similar rationale in a 1978 case, the Court upheld the
Price-Anderson Act, which imposed a limitation on liability for nu-
clear accidents in federally licensed private nuclear power plants. 79
The Price-Anderson Act's "panoply of remedies and guarantees,"
noted Chief Justice Burger, "is at the least a reasonably just substitute
for the common-law rights replaced by the Price-Anderson Act. Noth-
ing more is required by the Due Process Clause." 8 ° Two years later,
Justice Marshall reiterated that "[q]uite serious constitutional ques-
tions might be raised if a legislature attempted to abolish certain cate-
gories of common-law rights in some general way."'81 Indeed, he
continued, "our cases demonstrate that there are limits on govern-
mental authority to abolish 'core' common-law rights.., at least with-
out a compelling showing of necessity or a provision for a reasonable
alternative remedy.
1 8 2
Thus, while the Court has not established a bright line test for
due process infractions, it has repeatedly intimated that litigants pos-
sess a nucleus of rights under the common law that may not be trans-
gressed without substituting rough equivalents. The proposed
tobacco settlement indisputably abridges rights long held under the
common law. Class actions, for example, can be traced to the English
"bill of peace" in the seventeenth century, which allowed a representa-
tive party to sue when the number of persons was too large to permit
joinder, the class members had a common interest, and the absent
members were adequately represented.8 3 And the origin of punitive
damages extends back to eighteenth century English decisions in
which punitive awards were associated with honor, insult, and other
dignitary torts. 18 4
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 64 (1978).
180. Id. at 93.
181. Pruneyard Shopping CIT. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1980) (Marshall, J.
concurring).
182. Id.
183. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 683 (7th ed. 1997). See generally STE-
PHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987).
184. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 1 3.11(1) (2nd ed. 1993).
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The question, then, is whether proscribing class actions, eliminat-
ing punitive damages, and capping compensatory damages - each of
which, standing alone, is concededly within the scope of legislative
power - are cumulatively so grave as to reduce common-law rights
below a base level to which we are constitutionally entitled. If that is
the case, then the rights thus denied must be replaced by other rights
that will restore the depleted core. Clearly, the tobacco settlement
has offered future litigants no substitute for the rights that it will take
away. Therein lies a denial of due process.
IV. FEDERAL AUTHORIZATION TO REGULATE TOBACCO
A. Congress'Power Under the Commerce Clause
While it is questionable whether states can constitutionally enact
legislation that bans class actions, prohibits punitive damages, and
puts limits on compensatory damages,' there should be little doubt
that such legislation is beyond the authority of Congress to enact.1i 6
Nor is there constitutional authorization for a general regulatory
power at the federal level that extends to health restrictions on to-
bacco products.
As the Supreme Court said in the 1995 Lopez case, "The Constitu-
tion creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers." 8 7 The
powers of Congress are delegated by the people, enumerated in the
Constitution, and thus are limited by that delegation and enumera-
tion."8 The point is made in the very first sentence of the Constitu-
tion, after the Preamble."8 9 It is reiterated in the Tenth Amendment:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states respec-
tively, or to the people."' 0
Nowhere in the Constitution is a national police power - entail-
ing such concerns as health, morality, education, and welfare - con-
185. See supra Part III.
186. See, e.g., Tribe Testimony, supra note 118, at 10 ("For Congress directly to regulate the
procedures used by state courts in adjudicating state-law tort claims - to forbid them, for
example, from applying their generally applicable class action procedures in cases involv-
ing tobacco suits - would raise serious questions under the Tenth Amendment and prin-
ciples of federalism.").
187. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
188. See generally Roger Pilon, A Government of Limited Powers, in THE CATO HANDBOOK
FOR CONGRESS, 104TH CONG., 17-34 (The Cato Institute ed., 1995).
189. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (stating "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.").
190. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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ferred upon Congress. Indeed, Justice Joseph Story, an ardent
nationalist, remarked that inspection and health regulations, even
those that affected interstate commerce, were "purely internal" and
do not come under the purview of Congress.1 91
But as the country grew and some believed that problems re-
quired national solutions, Congress sought to earmark a specified
constitutional power that would justify its ambitious regulatory
agenda."9 2 The Commerce Clause... became the vehicle of choice,
notwithstanding that its central purpose is quite different.' 94 Con-
sider the historical account offered by Justice Stevens, in a recent
Supreme Court case:
During the first years of our history as an independent con-
federation, the National Government lacked the power to
regulate commerce among the States. Because each state
was free to adopt measures fostering its own local interest
without regard to possible prejudice to nonresidents, what
Justice Johnson characterized as a "conflict of commercial
regulations, destructive to the harmony of the States" en-
sued. In his view, this "was the immediate cause that led to
the forming of a [constitutional] convention. If there was
any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the
constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse
among the States free from all invidious and partial
restraints." 9 '
Lamentably, instead of assuring that interstate trade was "free
from all invidious and partial restraints,"' 96 Congress has expanded
the Commerce Clause to a general regulatory power - tantamount to
a national police power. 197 And the Court - especially after Franklin
191. SeeJOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 368
(photo. reprint 1987) (1833).
192. See Pilon, supra note 188, at 21 (asserting that the growth of federal power and
programs involving business regulation, civil rights, and environmental regulation has
taken place under the Commerce Clause).
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating "To regulate Commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
194. See Pilon, supra note 188, at 21.
195. Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1595-96
(1977) (citations omitted) (holding the state property tax violated the Commerce Clause
because the property tax exemption for charitable institutions excludes charitable organi-
zations operating principally for the benefit of nonresidents).
196. Id.
197. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,567 (1995) ("To uphold the Government's
contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would
bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken
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Roosevelt's notorious Court-packing scheme - has facilitated federal
overreaching by condoning legislation that has no basis whatever in
the Constitution.' If Congress thinks it necessary to add to its enu-
merated powers, the Framers crafted an amendment process for that
purpose.1 99 Rather than avail itself of that process, however, Congress
has simply ignored the limits set by the Constitution and eviscerated
our most basic defense against tyranny: the doctrine of enumerated
powers.
Today, we are in dire need of a re-limitation of federal power,
which has ballooned in large measure through amplification of the
Commerce Clause. Instead of serving as a shield against interference
by the states, the commerce power has become a sword wielded by the
federal government in pursuit of a boundless array of social and eco-
nomic programs. In a recent article in the Harvard Law Review, North-
western University law professor Gary Lawson got it exactly right:
"The post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and its
validation by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless
constitutional revolution. '" 200
The fundamental principle, then, is simply this: No matter how
worthwhile an end may be, if there is no constitutional authority to
pursue it, then the federal government must step aside and leave the
matter to the states or to private parties. Congress can proceed only
from constitutional authority, not from good intentions alone. That
was the principle the Court restated in Lopez when it said, for the first
time in nearly 60 years, that the power of Congress to regulate com-
merce among the states is not a power to regulate anything and every-
thing.20 1 In applying that principle, however, the Court went only a
little way toward rolling back Congress's expansions, saying that Con-
gress must show that the regulated activity "substantially" affects inter-
long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action.... [B]ut we
decline here to proceed any futher.").
198. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387,
1443-54 (1987).
199. See U.S. CONST. art. V:
The Congress whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as
part of this Constitution when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the
several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.
200. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1231,
1231 (1994).
201. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-58.
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state commerce. 20 2 As Justice Thomas said in his concurrence, that is
not a proper reading of the Commerce Clause, which was meant to
enable Congress to assure the free flow of goods and services among
the states.
2 0 3
Applied to the case at hand, for Congress to have authority to
legislate in this area, it is not enough to proclaim that tobacco prod-
ucts are transported across state lines and sold in large volume to cus-
tomers in many states. To legitimately invoke the commerce power,
Congress must show that the proposed settlement is necessary (i.e.,
essential) and proper (i.e., not violative of other rights) to assure the
free flow of interstate commerce. 20 4 There has been no such showing
by Congress or by any of the parties to this settlement. Nor could
there be. Health risks attributable to tobacco, and marketing tactics
by tobacco companies, have little to do with the unhampered move-
ment of trade. They are, incontrovertibly, subjects of a police power
that belongs, under our system, to the states.
Should the states adopt inconsistent or conflicting regulations
that interfere with the free flow of commerce, then Congress can
surely supersede such regulations and remove any such interstate bar-
riers.20 5 But the states have either refrained from legislating in re-
spect of tobacco marketing and health risks, or have legislated in a
manner that creates no serious obstacles to trade. 20 6 And differences
among the states with regard to class certification, punitive damages,
and caps on compensatory damages - to the extent there are such
differences - have not been demonstrated to prevent, delay, or di-
minish interstate transactions.
Accordingly, it is fair to conclude that the federal government is
not constitutionally authorized to enact legislation that partially im-
munizes the tobacco industry from litigation or that enacts the re-
maining provisions of the proposed tobacco settlement. Absent
constitutional authorization, Congress should move promptly and em-
phatically to reject any proffered tobacco settlement and help restore
the doctrine of delegated, enumerated and, therefore, limited powers.
202. See id. at 559.
203. See id. at 586-89 (Thomas, J. concurring).
204. See Lawson, supra note 200, at 1234-35.
205. See Pilon, supra note 188, at 21.
206. See James T. O'Reilly, A Consistent Ethic of Safety Regulations: The Case for Improving
Regulation of Tobacco Products, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 215, 244 (1989).
1998]
74 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAw & POLICY
B. Congress'Power to Tax and Spend
One suggested alternative to the proposed settlement is for Con-
gress to use its taxing and spending power 20 7 - e.g., by implementing
a surcharge on Medicare or an additional excise tax on tobacco - to
fund the treatment of ill smokers. 2 s That option would be simpler
and administratively less expensive. In the case of an excise tax hike,
the parties who would pay the tax (smokers and tobacco companies)
are the same parties who would pick up the bill if the settlement were
approved. On the other hand, there are several powerful reasons not
to consider a tax increase as the solution to the tobacco problem.
First, the Medicare system is itself constitutionally infirm; there is
no enumerated power that authorizes the federal government to re-
distribute income in order to finance health insurance for the elderly.
Second, the Medicare tax is imposed upon nonsmokers as well as
smokers. If any adjustment in Medicare were to be made, it should be
to increase premiums for smokers alone. Third, as noted above, re-
searchers have concluded that tobacco excise taxes already offset the
entire public costs associated with smoking-related illnesses. 20 9 And
fourth, the courtroom, not the Congress, affords parties an opportu-
nity to defend themselves. Ajust society cannot suffer its national leg-
islature to embark upon a punitive crusade against an outcast industry
without guaranteeing due process. 210
Of paramount importance, federal taxation for treatment of ill
smokers is an idea that reflects a profound misunderstanding of Con-
gress's authority to tax and spend. The power to "lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defense and general Welfare '211 has been accorded
three markedly different interpretations. One interpretation, held to-
day by many in Congress, is that Congress was granted plenary power
to determine and provide for the general welfare. 212 Serious scholars,
as well as the Supreme Court, have rejected that view because it mani-
festly contradicts the premise of limited government; indeed, it would
render the Constitution's list of enumerated powers entirely
superfluous.213
207. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
208. See Christopher May, Smoke and Mirrors: Florida's Tobacco-Related Medicaid Costs May
Turn Out to be a Mirage, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1061, 1083-84, 1087 (1997) (noting suggestions
that earmark excise taxes for smoking-related illnesses).
209. See Viscusi, supra note 56, at 51.
210. See supra Part II1.
211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
212. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64 (1936).
213. See id. at 64-65.
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A second view, held by Alexander Hamilton, is that the General
Welfare Clause conferred on Congress a power to tax and spend over
and above its power to carry out its other enumerated powers - pro-
vided only that the spending was for the general rather than for any
particular welfare." 4 In 1936, that construction was accepted by the
Court in the Butler case.2 15 The Court distinguished national (i.e.,
general) from local (i.e., particular) benefits, retaining for itself the
prerogative to decide what Congress was about.2 1 6 But less than a year
later, in Helvering v. Davis, the Court abandoned its oversight function,
holding that the discretion to distinguish national from local "belongs
to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary
power." '2 17 That left things for all practical purposes in the hands of
Congress. As constitutional scholar Roger Pilon has put it:
[A] Ithough Congress's now independent power to spend for
the general welfare was still limited by the word "general,"
the Court would not itself police that limitation but would
instead defer to Congress as to whether any expenditure was
general or particular - the very Congress that was already
raiding the Treasury and redistributing its contents with ever
greater particularity. 218
Not surprisingly, no federal statute has ever been invalidated because
it did not serve the general welfare. So much for enumerated powers
- the centerpiece of the Constitution.
The third interpretation - which in truth was the original under-
standing - comes from James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who
argued that the General Welfare Clause conferred no additional
power whatever: it was a summary or convenient means of referring to
the enumerated powers in the aggregate; it was a further shield
against the power to tax and spend for enumerated ends, by limiting
that power to serving the general welfare. 2 19 Thus, like the Commerce
Clause properly construed, the General Welfare Clause was meant to
be a shield against the abuse of power, not a sword of power, as it is
today.
Plainly, Madison and Jefferson were correct. If Congress could
first define the general welfare, then appropriate money for its fur-
214. See id. at 65-66.
215. See id. at 66.
216. See id. at 66-67.
217. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
218. Roger Pilon, A Court Without a Compass, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 999, 1005 (1996); see
also Pilon, supra note 188, at 22-23.
219. See Pilon, supra note 218, at 1004-05 & n.25; see also Butler, 297 U.S. at 65.
19981
76 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
therance, any limits on federal power where money is involved evapo-
rates. Even if Congress had no power at all to enact legislation, it
could simply appropriate funds and claim that it was exercising an
independent power to provide for the general welfare. Unhappily,
that is precisely what has transpired in the wake of the New Deal
Court.
Today, of course, the redistributive powers of Congress are
everywhere - except in the Constitution. The result is the
feeding frenzy that is modern Washington, the Hobbesian
war of all against all as each tries to get his share and more of
the common pot the tax system fills. That must be ended. It
is unseemly and wrong. More than that, it is unconstitu-
tional, whatever the slim and cowed majority on the New
Deal Court may have said. The Framers did not empower
government to take from some and give to others. They did
not establish a welfare state. 220
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Professor Tribe, in his Senate testimony, argued that the pro-
posed tobacco settlement actually fosters smaller government. He as-
serted that the settlement will not "create another unnecessary federal
bureaucracy," primarily because no group is more interested than the
attorneys general "in federalism, states' rights, and the Tenth Amend-
ment." The focus is on "decentralization," he continued; thus the set-
tlement "should not be greeted... with suspicion that it's just another
big Washington program"; it involves "market-based incentive[s], not
command-and-control regulation. "221
That incredible statement misrepresents the division of power be-
tween federal and state authorities, and implies that decentralization
is a guarantee against the abuse of power. Quite possibly, Professor
Tribe has conflated power with programs. Federalism - a jurisdic-
tional matter - is quintessentially about the locus of power; and the
proposed settlement locates power in federal not state agencies. The
size of government, on the other hand, is a function of its programs,
the scope of which determines the extent of governmental intrusion
into private affairs. Smaller government cannot be achieved by feder-
ally mandated programs, operative in all 50 states, even if adminis-
tered by state and local bureaucrats. There is but one way to reduce
220. Pilon, supra note 188, at 23.
221. See Tribe Testimony, supra note 118, at 2.
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the size of government: repeal old programs and avoid new ones, es-
pecially a massive new one like the tobacco settlement.
It is difficult to imagine that legislation could transgress as many
constitutional principles as the proposed settlement does - the more
egregious infractions involve commercial speech, litigants' rights, due
process, enumerated powers, federalism, and the non-delegation doc-
trine. And even if Congress could somehow identify a constitutional
underpinning for the settlement, it is indisputably bad public policy.
To say that Congress may enact legislation is not to say that Congress
is well-advised to do so.
The correct disposition of the tobacco settlement is the one that
Steve Forbes has suggested for the tax code: Kill it, drive a stake
through its heart, bury it, and start over. To secure the liberty of all
citizens, we must resolutely defend and protect our least popular citi-
zens, including the tobacco companies. Disputes between private par-
ties cannot be resolved in secret negotiations involving defendants
who have the boot of government resting on their necks, state attor-
neys general who seek to replenish their Medicaid coffers without fis-
cal discipline, contingency fee lawyers who wield the sword of the state
while retaining a financial interest in the outcome, and advocacy
groups that have subordinated the rule of law to their health con-
cerns, however well-intentioned. Our courts, not our legislatures, are
constituted for the resolution of private disputes. They can do justice
only if the rule of law - objective and evenhanded - is scrupulously
applied.
Meanwhile, Congress should phase out tobacco support pro-
grams. The president can exhort youngsters not to smoke. States
should vigorously enforce laws against the sale of tobacco products to
teenagers, demand proof of age at retail establishments, and regulate
vending machine sales in areas like arcades and schools. The front-
line defense against inadequate labeling and other deceptive advertis-
ing is common law fraud. Although the post-1937 expansive view of
the Commerce Clause would likely permit the federal government to
dictate cigarette warning labels, a correct reading of the clause would
obligate Congress to predicate any such legislation upon a determina-
tion that a national uniform rule is imperative to facilitate the free
flow of commerce. Alternatively, if various states, pursuant to their
police power, established incompatible labeling requirements, Con-
gress could act upon finding that the incompatibility threatened to
impede interstate commercial dealings. Otherwise, warning labels are
properly beyond the reach of the federal government.
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Most important, state and federal courts must not allow state at-
torneys general to proceed with their Medicaid reimbursement suits,
which deny due process to a single, unpopular industry. States may
not retroactively impose new rules of law; and individuals must be
held accountable for the consequences of their actions. Otherwise, if
we are foolish enough to continue along the path outlined in the
"Proposed Resolution," the resolution itself should be stamped with a
label: "Warning: This Settlement is Dangerous to Your Liberty."
